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Abstract: Recent literature has argued that what makes certain activities ranging
from curing cancer to running a marathon count as achievements, and what
makes achievements intrinsically valuable is, centrally, that they involve great ef-
fort. Although there is much the difficulty-based view gets right, I argue that it
generates the wrong results about some central cases of achievement, and this is
because it is too narrowly focused on only one perfectionist capacity, the will. I
propose a revised perfectionist account on which an achievement is an activity
that fully exercises or expresses any number of a range of perfectionist capacities.
1. Introduction
Some of the activities we take to be achievements have results or products
with great instrumental value: curing cancer, raising children, and creating
beautiful works of art. But others do not. Among the achievements we typ-
ically value are activities like running a marathon, climbing Mt. Everest, or
writing a piece of philosophy that no one reads. In these cases, the result of
the activity has little to no instrumental value. Can we give some unified ac-
count of the value of achievement that explains why both curing cancer and
climbing Mt. Everest are achievements of great intrinsic value?
One feature all the aforementioned activities have in common is that they
require significant effort. If all achievements are difficult, it is natural to
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suspect that difficulty itself plays some role in explaining the nature and
value of achievements. Indeed, recent literature has argued that what makes
certain activities count as achievements, and what makes achievements
intrinsically valuable is, centrally, that they involve great effort. Gwen
Bradford, in her recent book Achievement, develops and defends the most
worked out version of a difficulty-based account of achievement.1 She ar-
gues that the value of the product of an achievement makes no contribution
to its essential value. Rather, we should understand the value of achieve-
ments in perfectionist terms: achievements allow us to exercise characteristic
human capacities, to fully express aspects of our nature, and to fully ‘be all
we can be’.2 And chief among these capacities is ‘the will’. When we exert
great effort to overcome difficulty, we exercise this characteristic human ca-
pacity in an intrinsically valuable way.
Although there is much the difficulty-based view gets right, I argue that it
generates the wrong results about some central cases of achievement, and
this is because it is too narrowly focused on only one perfectionist capacity,
the will. I propose a revised perfectionist account onwhich an achievement is
an activity that fully exercises or expresses any number of a range of perfec-
tionist capacities. The account, Aristotelian in spirit, better captures the way
in which, as in the case of creative capacities, the value of a product of an
achievement doesmake a contribution to its essential value. Likewise, it bet-
ter captures cases of certain highly developed skills or abilities where part of
what makes an agent’s activity an achievement is that it is effortless for her.
An additional attractive feature of this account is that it offers a perfectionist
explanation of the badness of certain forms of injustice or bad luck: although
they might provide an opportunity for the exercise of the will, structural in-
justice or bad luck often impedes the full realization of other perfectionist
capacities.
In Section 2, I review the main features of the difficulty-based account,
focusing on the view developed by Bradford. In Section 3, I suggest that
difficulty-based accounts fail to capture cases where, it seems, the value
of an achievement depends for its realization on the value of the product
of an achievement. And, in Section 4, I argue that difficulty is itself not
an essential feature of achievement, and an increase in difficulty does
not necessarily increase the value of an achievement, other things being
equal. In some cases, effortlessness itself is a source of value for an
achievement. The underlying problem, I suggest in Section 5, is the diffi-
culty-based account’s over-reliance on one general capacity, the will, to ex-
plain the nature and value of all achievements. A more plausible
perfectionist account should relativize judgments about achievement to a
wider range of distinct capacities. Although the will is fully expressed in
effortful activity independent of any result or product, other capacities
are only fully expressed in a particular kind of product or in effortless ac-
tivity. In Section 6, I propose an alternative: an achievement is a process
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culminating in a product that is competently caused and that tests the limit
of an agent’s perfectionist capacity.
2.
Building on work by Simon Keller, Joseph Raz, and Thomas Hurka, Gwen
Bradford defends the most comprehensive difficulty-based account of the
nature and value of achievement.3 It will be helpful to consider Bradford’s
view in some detail as a representative of the general strategy.
There are three parts to Bradford’s account for achievement. First, an
achievement is characterized by a process–product structure: all achieve-
ments have a process that culminates in a product. Sometimes the product
is some result or outcome beyond the activity itself, such as writing a novel,
whereas sometimes the product is itself the activity, such as playing a piece of
music. Second, an achievement must be difficult.4 Intuitively, for someone
able-bodied, tying one’s shoelaces is not an achievement in the relevant
sense. However, it may well count as an achievement for someone with ad-
vanced Parkinson’s disease. Third, an achievement must be a process culmi-
nating in a product that is competently caused. An individual who
unwittingly stumbles on the cure for cancer has not achieved something
great, notwithstanding that her accidental discovery has great instrumental
value. It isn’t an achievement for her because it isn’t caused by her in the
right kind of way.5
Having established the features that she takes to be essential to achieve-
ment, Bradford asks what accounts for the value of achievement. She rejects
one initially plausible view, which she labels the Simple Product View, ac-
cording to which an achievement is only as valuable as the end it accom-
plishes. On this view, curing cancer, creating an enduring work of art, and
writing a piece of philosophy that advances the literature are all valuable
achievements because the ends they accomplish have great instrumental
value. If the end isn’t valuable, then the activity is not an achievement.
Although a natural way of capturing the value of these kinds of achieve-
ments, Bradford argues that the Simple Product View cannot be right be-
cause it fails to capture the value of achievements in cases where the
products have zero value. Climbing Mt. Everest is, intuitively, an achieve-
ment of great value. But, Bradford points out, simply being at the top of a
mountain is, by itself, of little intrinsic value. If the end of this activity is be-
ing at the top of Everest, the Simple Product View can’t seem to distinguish
between the value of climbing Mount Everest and the value of taking a he-
licopter to the top. Indeed, on the Simple Product View, it looks as though
climbing rather than flying to the top is simply pointless, wasted effort.6
Defenders of the Simple Product View might respond that it is the process
of climbing Everest that is itself a valuable end. Here, however, Bradford
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worries that any way in which the defender of the Simple Product View de-
velops this response – by appealing to the way in which climbing Everest is a
great display of tenacity, physical strength, or courage – will amount to an
appeal to difficulty to explain the value of the process of climbing Everest.
If the value of the end that is accomplished doesn’t explain the value of
achievements, what does? Bradford offers the reader a thought experiment,
A Tale of Two Novels:
A Tale of Two Novels
Smith and Jones are both writers. They both write novels of equal value. Smith’s experiencewrit-
ing the novel is fairly typical, alternating between the usual frustrations of the writing process,
and periods that are enjoyable and productive. By contrast, Jones encounters tremendous obsta-
cles while writing his novel: he loses his wife, his house, his dog, he struggles with mental health
issues, and finds the writing process utterly agonizing.7
Bradford argues that Jones’ achievement is clearly the better achievement.
And, she notices, the Simple Product View cannot capture this intuition:
again, on this view, all that matters is the value of the product of the achieve-
ment. The extreme difficulty that Jones faces relative to Smith is irrelevant
for the value of the achievement. What this example suggests, Bradford ar-
gues, is that it is the difficulty itself that accounts for the greater value of
Jones’ achievement. After all, by stipulation, the only difference between
these two cases is the greater difficulty Jones faces. If the more difficult activ-
ity is more valuable, other things being equal, the most natural explanation
is that the difficulty itself is the source of this additional value.
It might seem odd to talk about difficulty itself as being a source of value,
but Bradford offers a perfectionist story to capture how Jones’ achievement
is greater than Smith’s. Perfectionism says that the exercise and development
of characteristically human capacities is intrinsically valuable. Bradford sug-
gests that difficulty is valuable because it involves the exercise of a distinct
and characteristic human capacity: the will. Difficulty is a matter of exerting
effort for Bradford, and exerting effort is just what it is to exercise the will.
Overcoming difficulty involves the exercise of a characteristically human ca-
pacity, and so, according to perfectionism, an activity that involves over-
coming difficulty will be valuable, even if the product of the activity has
zero value. Moreover, the value of achievements increases as the difficulty
increases, other things being equal.8
Difficulty isn’t the only source of value for achievements on Bradford’s ac-
count. Insofar as part of what it is to be an achievement is to be competently
caused, achievements also involve the exercise of one’s rational capacities,
and this rational activity is also a source of value.Moreover, because achieve-
ments involve the exercise of both one’s will and one’s rational capacities in a
single process culminating in a product, Bradford suggests there is value to
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this activity insofar as it is an instance of ‘unity in diversity’: achievements are
organic unities and, as a unity of diverse elements, have greater value than the
diverse elements themselves were they a mere aggregate.9
To be clear, Bradford also allows that other factors, such as the value of
the process or product, will at times contribute to the value of an achieve-
ment, but crucially, the way they do so is not in virtue of the essential features
of achievement. Consider a variant on the aforementioned case, A Tale of
Two Songwriters10:
A Tale of Two Songwriters
Taylor and Katy are both songwriters. Although they both love songwriting, and both devote
equal effort to it, Taylor has a great deal more natural talent than Katy. Due to favorable cir-
cumstances and great dedication, they both write the best songs they could have possibly written
given their creative abilities. However, Taylor’s songs are beautiful, moving and exhibit a great
deal of technical proficiency, while Katy’s songs are mediocre and uninspired.
Although it is tempting to think that Taylor has achieved more than Katy,
Bradford’s view is that the essential value of their respective achievements
is in fact equal. Again, achievements are essentially valuable in virtue of their
being difficult, competently caused, and organic unities. And, by stipulation,
the achievements of both Taylor and Katy involve equal amounts of effort,
while also being competently caused and organic unities. So, although
Taylor’s songs might have much greater instrumental value than those of
Katy – they delight millions of people, they generate enormous revenue
for her record company, they inspire a new generation of songwriters – the
essential value of Taylor’s achievement is no greater than that of Katy’s.
Notice that just as the value of the product does not contribute to the es-
sential value of an achievement, so also an agent’s natural talents or abilities
do not make a difference to the value of her achievement. Bradford’s ac-
count of achievement is, in this way, remarkably egalitarian: anyone can
achieve something great, regardless of their natural endowments or opportu-
nities, so long as they put in the effort.11 An amputee’s running a mile might
be no less an achievement than an elite runner’s winning the Boston mara-
thon, so long as they exert an equal amount of effort. Likewise, a third
grader’s solution to a simple mathematical equation might be no less an
achievement than a brilliant mathematician’s discovery of a new proof, so
long as they exert an equal amount of effort.
3.
Bradford is, I think, right to reject the view according to which the value of
an achievement is reducible to the value of the product. If we are to do justice
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to our intuitions, we want an account that can capture the intuitive value of
activities like running marathons and climbing mountains. Moreover, I
think it is a promising strategy to look to perfectionism for an account for
the nature and value of achievement. It is natural to think that the value
of running marathons and climbing mountains has something to do with re-
alizing our potential, ‘being all that we can be’. But, I argue in this section, it
doesn’t follow from the rejection of the Simple Product View that the value
of the product of an achievement makes no contribution to its essential
value.
3.1.
To see how the value of an achievement might depend on the value of the
product, consider an example adapted from Virginia Woolf’s A Room of
One’s Own: A Tale of Two Poets.12
A Tale of Two Poets
William and Judith are siblings in Elizabethan England. They are both naturally gifted poets;
let’s suppose they are equally talented, curious, and passionate about writing. But, whereasWil-
liam is sent to grammar school from a young age, given freedom and resources to explore the
theatre and pursue his passion in London, Judith is kept busy at home with household chores,
discouraged from creative activities and married against her will at a young age. Suppose that
Judith, in the little spare time she has, is able to piece together a literary education from her
brother’s books, and occasionally manages to scribble sonnets on scraps of paper. However,
without access to the resources and time necessary to develop her abilities, the sonnets she writes
are of middling value. By contrast, William produces some of the most enduring literary classics
of the Western world.
Again, by stipulation,William and Judith are equally talented.Hadmaterial
conditions been different, Judith too would have produced works of out-
standing literary quality. Indeed, this is precisely Woolf’s point in imagining
Judith’s story: she argues that it is not lack of talent but lack of resources and
opportunities that explains why there have historically been so few women
writing great works of literature. And, Woolf invites us to think, this is a
tragedy. Conditions in Elizabethan England and elsewhere have robbed
women for generations of the opportunity to develop and express their cre-
ative abilities.
What does the difficulty-based view say about this case? This depends on
the level of difficulty that William and Judith respectively encounter. Sup-
pose first, as seems plausible, Judith faces greater difficulty than William.
Beyond the struggles of the creative process, beyond her finding the time
and emotional resources to write, we can suppose that Judith is faced with
humiliation, abuse, and ridicule for her literary attempts.13 On the diffi-
culty-based view, although William’s achievement in writing literary
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masterpieces is surely greater than Judith’s in various ways, the essential
value of his achievement is less than that of Judith’s, and this is because he
faces less difficulty than her and so exercises his will to a lesser degree. In-
deed, on Bradford’s view, the essential value of Judith’s achievement is
greater in her current circumstance than it would have been had she experi-
enced less difficulty and, as a result, wrote significantly better poetry.
This strikes me as a counterintuitive result, especially for a perfectionist
account of achievement according to which there is something valuable
about the development and exercise of one’s capacities. It seems natural to
think that Judith in her current circumstance fails to achieve what she other-
wise might have and that her failure is a result of the unjust conditions she
finds herself in. That is, it seems natural to think that Judith’s achievement
would have been greater had she encountered fewer obstacles and had she
had the chance to develop and express her creative abilities in the way that
William does. Likewise, it seems to me natural to think that William is able
to achieve something more valuable than Judith, and this is because he faces
fewer obstacles to developing and expressing his talents. But, on the diffi-
culty-based view, the difficulty Judith faces does not prevent her from
achieving something as valuable as what William achieves; on the contrary,
the greater difficulty she faces is an additional source of value for her
achievement relative to William.
There are a number of responses available to the difficulty-based view in
the face of this sort of concern. To the extent we have the intuition that Wil-
liam’s achievement is greater or more valuable than Judith’s, Bradford
might insist this is in virtue of its nonessential features. Again, Bradford’s
view allows the value of a product can make a contribution to the value of
an achievement, not just a contribution to its essential value. The literary
works that William produces are great achievements in an agent-neutral
sense: they have enormous literary value and have delighted and enriched
people for generations. This explains why we might be more impressed by
what William does than by what Judith does. It is only with respect to the
essential value of the achievement that Judith’s is greater than William’s.
And, Bradford might insist, our intuitions are not a reliable guide to the es-
sential as opposed to nonessential value of an achievement.14 Bradford can
also just resist the intuition that William’s achievement is obviously greater
than Judith’s by pointing to the great difficulty that Judith would have had
to overcome to write even mediocre sonnets. There is something deeply im-
pressive about Judith producing anything at all under the conditions she
finds herself in, and Bradford’s view is well placed to capture this. Judith ex-
ercises her will in overcoming the structural injustices she faces as a woman,
and as such, her achievement is of great value despite the mediocrity of the
product. Our intuition that William’s achievement is greater than Judith’s
might stem in part from a failure to be attentive to the greater obstacles that
Judith faced and the remarkable determination she exhibited in the face of
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them. If her achievement was more difficult, then Bradford might say, her
achievement has greater essential value for her thanWilliam’s does for him.
I worry however that, these responses notwithstanding, there is still some-
thing that the difficulty-based view is unable to capture about this case. Sup-
pose, for simplicity’s sake, that William and Judith encounter an equal level
of difficulty and so also exert an equal amount of effort, although William
produces enduring literary classics and Judith produces middling poetry.
And suppose we grant the difficulty-based view the judgment that the essen-
tial value of their achievements is the same. Notice, however, that even if the
amount of difficulty they face is equal, the source of difficulty in their respec-
tive cases is very different. SupposeWilliam spendsmost of his waking hours
writing, obsessively editing, and revising until he feels satisfied with the fin-
ished product. And, suppose, although Judith spends less time struggling
with the writing process itself, she encounters a different sort of difficulty:
she struggles to find the time to write amidst her other responsibilities and,
when she does find the time, she struggles emotionally to convince herself
that her writing isn’t just a trivial distraction, one inappropriate for a woman
in her position. Even if their achievements are of equal essential value, they
are, in some important sense, different kinds of achievements. The difficulty
William faces is largely what we might think of as intrinsic to the writing
process itself. The effort he exerts is in exercising his creative abilities to re-
alize a certain kind of product. His achievement, it is natural to think, is a
creative one. By contrast, much of the difficulty that Judith faces is in over-
coming the barriers to her attempting to write at all: much of the effort she
exerts is not in the writing process itself but in negotiating obstacles and frus-
trations extrinsic to the writing process. Her achievement, to the extent she
has one, is largely a kind of psychological one.
The difficulty-based view cannot distinguish between the kind of achieve-
ment Judith is capable of in her current unjust circumstances and the kind of
achievement she would be capable of were she to have the same opportuni-
ties and resources as William. Otherwise put, the difficulty-based view is in-
sensitive to whether the difficulty involved in an achievement is intrinsic or
extrinsic to a particular process.15 What we want to say about Judith’s case
is that, although she exerts her will to a high degree in her current situation,
she is robbed of the opportunity to fully realize her creative abilities, to pro-
duce the kind of poetry she is capable of: the difficulty she encounters makes
possible one kind of an achievement but only at the expense of another.
Again, there is something admirably egalitarian about Bradford’s view:
achievements are available to any agent who tries hard enough. But what
this case suggest is that there is a corresponding problem for Bradford’s
view: it is excessively optimistic about whether achieving something is in
our power. On Bradford’s view, so long as it is competently caused, an activ-
ity counts as an achievement just in case the agent exerts a sufficient degree
of effort. And presumably, it is nearly always up to an agent whether she
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exerts a sufficient degree of effort. But, in cases like Judith’s, what we see is
that factors outside of one’s control – ranging from bad luck to systematic
structural injustice – can prevent an agent from fully expressing or making
manifest the abilities she has. Intuitively, what is so tragic about Judith’s
writing onlymediocre sonnets is, in part, that she fails to fully realize a talent
she has, fails to fully be all she can be as a writer.
3.2.
So far, I’ve suggested that Bradford’s view cannot capture the way in which
the difficulty Judith encounters prevents her from achieving whatWilliam is
able to achieve, even if this difficulty makes possible the exercise of her will
to a high degree. Her view cannot distinguish between difficulty that is in-
trinsic or extrinsic to a particular achievement because it is indifferent to
the result or success of achievement-related processes.
We might think what Bradford’s account is missing is some reference to
the goals of an agent. Perhaps, if an activity is to count as an achievement,
an agent must actually reach the goal that she has set herself. If an achieve-
ment requires a reached goal, we can explain how Judith fails to achieve
what William does. Both Judith and William, we can imagine, set for them-
selves the goal of writing great literary works. William is successful while Ju-
dith, despite her best efforts, fails to achieve this goal.
I cannot do justice to the question of how goals and achievements are re-
lated, but suffice to say, I do not think this proposal resolves the present
problem. Building ‘reached goals’ into an account of achievement generates
the result that Judith’s achievement would be greater if her ambitions were
limited to what she could actually accomplish in her unjust circumstances.
This seems to me a perverse result. Intuitively, what prevents Judith from
achieving what William does is the constraints society places on her and
not the way she has failed to curb her ambitions to match her restricted op-
portunities. Moreover, it seems to me that Judith’s failure to fully develop
and express her creative abilities would be tragic even if she never set for her-
self the goal of writing a literary masterpiece. We can imagine that the op-
pressive conditions of Elizabeth England prevent her from accurately
judging what she is capable of. Although Judith feels the impulse to create,
she never dreams herself capable of writing anything remarkable. Even if
she is pleased with the middling sonnets she writes, she has still failed to
achieve what she is capable of.
More generally, I am not compelled by the idea that part of what it is for
an activity to be an achievement is that it accomplishes some goal that an
agent sets herself.16 Intuitively, William would accomplish something great
by writing a literary masterpiece even if he had set himself the wildly unreal-
istic goal of producing the best novel ever written. Likewise, William would
have failed to accomplish something great if he had limited his ambitions to
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merely writing a mediocre sonnet, when he was in fact capable of writing a
literary masterpiece. An agent’s goals seem important to the question of
how an agent’s achievement contributes to her well-being. But, like Brad-
ford, I take this question to be separate from the question of determining
the nature and value of achievements themselves.17
Perhaps, instead, the problemwith Bradford’s account is that she provides
an insufficient account of the difficulty essential to achievement. Von
Kriegstein argues that Bradford’s understanding of difficulty wholly in
terms of effort is not sufficient for capturing the role difficulty plays in deter-
mining the value of an achievement. Specifically, von Kriegstein worries,
Bradford’s account cannot capture the intuition that, for example, a natu-
rally gifted athlete who runs a record-breaking race has achieved something
greater than a recreational runner who exerts the same amount of effort to
just barely finish the same race. Von Kriegstein suggests that Bradford’s ac-
count needs to be supplemented with an agent-neutral dimension of diffi-
culty to capture the way in which natural talents or abilities can augment
the value of an achievement. Von Kriegstein proposes that an activity is dif-
ficult in this agent-neutral sense to the extent that an adult human being with
average capabilities is likely to fail when they try to do this activity. So an
achievement is ‘the successful (and competent) performance of an activity
that an adult human being with average capabilities would be likely to fail
at’.18 Some activities are achievements because they involve substantial ef-
fort, as on Bradford’s view. Some activities are achievements because they
are successful despite a low probability of success. And, von Kriegstein sug-
gests, the greatest achievements will be those that are difficult in both senses:
they are activities that most people would fail at and that require a substan-
tial amount of effort.
I am sympathetic to the idea that effort alone is insufficient to explain our
judgments about the value of achievement in certain cases. But I do not
think von Kriegstein’s proposal helps with the worry I am pressing here.
Consider what this account tells us about A Tale of Two Poets. Relative
to what an average human being is capable of, William has carried out
something exceptionally difficult in writing great literary masterpieces. So
it seems on von Kriegstein’s account that although William exerts the same
amount of effort as Judith, his achievement is greater than Judith’s by being
difficult in an additional, agent-neutral way. But, we might think, the son-
nets that Judith does manage to write, although middling, are still better
than what an average human would accomplish in her circumstances; there
is an agent-neutral sense in which what she does has a low probability of suc-
cess given the oppressive conditions she finds herself in. VonKriegstein’s ac-
count is meant to capture the way in which ‘internal endowments’ like
natural talents and abilities enhance the value of achievement; he wants to
distinguish these from ‘external endowments’ like wealth that do not en-
hance the value of an achievement even though they make possible
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accomplishments that would not otherwise have been available to the
agent.19 But what William is able to accomplish seems to be the result of
both an internal endowment, his natural literary talent, as well as an external
endowment, the absence of the oppressive conditions faced by his sister.
What does von Kriegstein’s view tell us about the overall value of William’s
achievement relative to Judith?20
If von Kriegstein’s view says that William’s achievement is greater than
that of Judith’s because he succeeds in doing something with a low probabil-
ity of success whereas she does not, the view does not seem to sufficiently dis-
tinguish between internal and external endowments.21 William is naturally
talented, but he is also privileged with opportunities and material resources
that Judith does not have access too; the fact that Judith fails whereWilliam
succeeds is not explained by her lack of talent but rather by the way in which
her circumstances prevent her from fully realizing that talent. If, on the other
hand, the view says that Judith’s achievement is greater than that of Wil-
liam’s because what she succeeds in doing has a low probability of success
given the adverse conditions she faces, the view gives us the counterintuitive
result that Judith is better off with respect to the value of her achievement in
her unjust circumstances than she would be were she to have the same op-
portunities as William.
Neither an appeal to the goals of an agent nor an account of difficulty as
low probability of success seem to me to help distinguish between the diffi-
culty that is intrinsic and the difficulty that is extrinsic to Judith’s creative
achievement. What A Tale of Two Poets suggests to me is that, at least in
some cases, the value of an achievement depends in part onwhether an agent
succeeds in making a particular kind of product. It seems to me natural to
think that the only way Judith can fully realize her creative talents is by ac-
tually writing something of literary value. However much effort she exerts,
Judith cannot, in her current situation, fully develop and express her creative
talents, and this is reflected in the middling quality of her work. Intuitively,
part of what it is to fully express or realize one’s creative talents – to achieve
something creative – is to actually make or create something that reflects
those talents.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the value of certain kinds of achieve-
ments is reducible to the value of their products; again, I think Bradford is
right to reject the Simple Product View. Rather, I’m suggesting that, for
some achievements, the value of the achievement depends for its realization
on a particular result or product. Judith’s creative ability is, by its nature, di-
rected at a certain kind of a product, excellent poetry. And, on account of
factors beyond her control, she is never able to make this product, and so
a certain kind of achievement is unavailable to her. In the same way, we
can imagine a skilled craftsman who doesn’t have access to the supplies nec-
essary to bring his imagined creations into being or a skilled cellist whomust
perform a difficult piece on a faulty instrument.
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Moreover, this phenomenon of the essential value of an achievement de-
pending in some way on the value of the product that results is not isolated
to cases of creative accomplishments. Consider a talented scientist whose
samples are contaminated by a jealous colleague with the result that she fails
to discover the cure for a rare disease. Wemight be inclined to think that, al-
though no fault of her own, she is unable to fully realize or express her ability
qua scientist. Likewise, an athlete who, after training for months, sprains her
ankle during a race and has to hobble to the finish is unable to achieve the re-
sult she is otherwise capable of; she is unable to fully realize or express her
ability qua athlete. In all these cases, my suggestion is, the individuals are un-
able to fully express their talents or abilities because they are unable to bring
about a certain kind of result or product. As such, they are unable to realize a
certain kind of perfectionist value, to ‘be all they can be’ in some activity.
I offer a deeper diagnosis of the problem for the difficulty-based view in
Section 5 and propose an alternative perfectionist account in Section 6. First,
however, I want to consider in more detail the role of difficulty in
achievement.
4.
As we saw, one natural intuition to have about the Tale of Two Poets is that
there is something truly impressive about Judith’s overcoming great obsta-
cles to write poetry. Bradford’s view is well placed to explain this. On her
view, difficulty is an essential feature of achievement, and the exercise of
the will is part of the essential value of an achievement. However, I have sug-
gested, even if this is part of the story, it cannot be the full story for
explaining the value of achievement: at least some of the time, the quality
of the resulting product also contributes in some way to the essential value
of achievement. I now want to put pressure on the idea that difficulty is an
essential feature of achievement at all. Not all achievements are difficult, I
argue, and the value of an achievement does not necessarily increase with in-
creased difficulty, other things being equal.
Consider a potential counter example to Bradford’s account that she her-
self discusses. Her difficulty-based account says that something is only an
achievement when it is difficult for the person who does it. But suppose a vi-
olin virtuoso effortlessly tosses off a flawless performance of a Paganini ca-
price. If the virtuoso’s performance is effortless, it is not an achievement on
this account however marvelous and impressive it is. This might strike us as
surprising; a highly talented musician performing a difficult piece with ease
might seem to be a paradigmatic example of an achievement. More surpris-
ing still, Bradford’s account seems to imply that the virtuoso’s performance,
if it counts as an achievement at all, will be less valuable than that of the me-
diocre amateur who blunders his way effortfully through the same piece.22
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Bradford argues that the virtuoso case is not, in fact, a counter example to
her view. Although the Paganini caprices are difficult for the average violin-
ist, and indeed, even for outstandingly talented violinist, they are not diffi-
cult for the virtuoso. As such, Bradford suggests, his performance is
difficult relative to the comparison class of talented violinists and so counts
as an achievement in some general sense, qua performance, but it is not an
achievement for him, insofar as it is not difficult for him.23 To the extent
we have the intuition that the virtuoso’s performance is an achievement,
we are thinking about the performance qua performance, relative to the
comparison class of talented violinists. However, if we are truly attentive
to the skill of the virtuoso, and to the effortlessness of his performance, we
can appreciate that his performance is no achievement for him; it requires
no great exercise of the will or exertion of effort.
I don’t think this response fully captures our intuitions about the virtuo-
so’s performance. There is something surely right about the idea that what
counts as an achievement for someone should be relative to the skill or abil-
ity she has. When I run ten miles, this is an achievement for me, but it would
not be for a seasoned ultra-marathoner. But this is different from insisting
that when an ultra-marathoner, after months of training, runs a smooth,
fluid race at a record pace, her achievement counts for less to the extent it felt
effortless. Bradford’s claims about the virtuoso generalize to any case where
an individual has acquired such a degree of skill that her exercise of that skill
feels easy, from the poet whose words flow from the pen to the ballet dancer
who dances with a weightless grace.
Take the case of an extremely talented and well-trained violinist. When
this violinist plays a very simple tune – one that would only be challenging
to a beginner – he does so with ease. He knows he is capable of playing a sig-
nificantly more complicated piece and does not feel any special pride or
sense of accomplishment in playing such a simple tune flawlessly and with
ease. Now, imagine the same violinist performs an extremely complex piece
aftermonths of practice – a piece that someone with any less talent, skill, and
practice would struggle to play – and does so with ease. Here, it seems tome,
it would be perfectly natural for the violinist to feel pride and a great sense of
accomplishment. And it would be natural for him to feel proud not just that
he played the piece without mistakes but also that he played it without
exerting significant effort or struggling. The effortlessness of his perfor-
mance is, I want to suggest, part of what makes his performance feel like
an achievement for him. The effortlessness reflects the degree to which he
has honed and developed his skill and then succeeded in realizing this skill
in the performance. I think this intuition is very naturally understood in per-
fectionist terms: the effortlessness of his performance expresses or makes
manifest the degree to which he has perfected his musical ability. Perfection-
ism tells us that the development and exercise of certain characteristic capac-
ities is intrinsically valuable, and in the virtuoso case, the violinist is
DIFFICULTY AND THE VALUE OF ACHIEVEMENT 13
© 2018 The Author
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2018 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
exercising a capacity that has been developed to such a degree that his per-
formance is like second nature to him. Had he trained less, developed his
skill to a lesser degree, such that his performance, although flawless, was la-
borious for him, he would not be fully expressing or realizing his ability qua
musician.24
Here, Bradfordmight offer a different suggestion for why the violinist’s ef-
fortless performance appears to be an achievement for him: she might sug-
gest it is not the performance itself, but the years of effortful training and
practice, that are an achievement for the violinist. Insofar as achievements
are processes culminating in products, Bradford might think that the history
of the violinist’s training is the process, culminating in violinist’s developed
skill that is the achievement explaining our intuitions about the case. But this
response still does not seem to fully capture our intuitions about the case.
Specifically, it seems to me that the violinist’s exercise of his developed skill
in his flawless, effortless performance is a further achievement, above and
beyond his acquisition of that skill through years of training. Suppose the vi-
olinist, after years of training, and months practicing a particular piece, in-
jures his wrist before the performance. It seems to me that he has achieved
less in this case than he would have had he been able to actually perform
the piece effortlessly, expressing or making manifest the skill he had
developed.
This idea, that ease can express or make manifest the perfection of one’s
capacities, is familiar to us fromAristotle. For example, in the case of ethical
virtue, Aristotle famously distinguishes between the fully virtuous agent and
the merely enkratic or self-controlled agent. Both agents correctly identify
the best action to perform in some circumstance, and both perform this ac-
tion, but the virtuous agent acts effortlessly, whereas the enkratic agent acts
grudgingly, struggling to overcome strong conflicting desires. The virtuous
agent has perfected her non-rational desiderative states to such a degree that,
when she judges that she ought to perform some action, she desires to per-
form it, takes pleasure in it, and experiences no strong conflicting desires
to perform a different action. By contrast, the merely self-controlled agent
does experience strong desires to act against what her reason judges to be
best; she does the right thing but has to force herself to do so, overcoming
her other impulses.25
Aristotle thinks that the fully virtuous agent is a better moral agent than
the merely self-controlled or enkratic agent. Of course, this claim that the
agent who acts with ease is better than the agent who must overcome her in-
clinations has been challenged in the Kantian tradition. But set aside the
question of which agent is morally better or more deserving of praise. What
is relevant for our purposes is that, as in A Tale of Two Poets, we likely have
competing intuitions depending onwhere we focus our attention. On the one
hand, if we focus just on who encountered more difficulty in her action and
who exercised her will to a greater degree, we are likely to think that the self-
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controlled agent achieved something impressive. But, on the other hand, if
we ask who had more fully developed and expressed her capacity for moral
agency, we are likely to think it is the virtuous agent, for whom acting virtu-
ously is second nature. And this latter impression should be especially pro-
nounced for someone who is moved by the perfectionist idea that there is
something deeply valuable about developing and expressing our characteris-
tic capacities. If we think it is strange for an account to deny that the virtu-
oso’s performance is a genuine achievement in part in virtue of its being
effortless, we should think it especially strange for a perfectionist account.
And this, notwithstanding that it is also impressive to overcome obstacles
and struggle. In what follows, I suggest there are resources within perfection-
ism to capture both of these intuitions in an account of the nature and value
of achievement.
5.
So far, I have suggested there are cases where the value of the product makes
a difference to the value of an achievement, and moreover, there are cases
where difficulty is not necessary for something to count as an achievement.
In both sorts of cases, I have been gesturing at the idea that our intuitions
about what counts as an achievement depend on the capacity in question.
In A Tale of Two Poets, it is natural to think that for Judith’s creative ability
to be fully expressed, she needs to actually produce poetry of a certain qual-
ity. Likewise, in virtuoso case, it is natural to think that the violinist fully ex-
presses his musical skill when he plays a complex piece with ease. In both
sorts of cases, it also seems natural to think that, when agents encounter ob-
stacles, they are provided the opportunity to exercise something like what
Bradford calls the will, and this exercise of the will also strikes us as intrinsi-
cally valuable.
What these cases suggest to me is that we tend relativize our judgments
about what counts as an achievement to the capacity in question. Qua crea-
tive capacity, Judith fails to achieve anything great. But qua force of will, Ju-
dith does achieve something impressive. Likewise, qua musical ability, the
virtuoso achieves something great. But qua perseverance in the face of diffi-
culty, the virtuoso does not. One initially attractive feature of Bradford’s
view is that it gives a highly general account of what achievements are and
of their essential value. But these cases suggest that the view purchases this
generality at too high a cost: Bradford needs to posit some one capacity,
the will, that is present in every case of achievement, but it isn’t obvious that
we need to do this nor that we should do it. The virtuoso doesn’t exercise his
will to any great degree, but it is easy enough to explain why his effortless
performance counts as a great achievement just by appeal to his musical
ability. Judith exercises her will to a high degree but is prevented from fully
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expressing her creative ability. It seems to me entirely consistent with our in-
tuitions to say that her writingmediocre sonnets counts as an achievement in
one respect and not in another.
As a first step in offering a positive alternative, I suggest we reject a diffi-
culty-based account of achievement in favor of one on which there are mul-
tiple capacities, and the full expression or realization of any of these
capacities will count as an achievement relative to that particular capacity.
Return to A Tale of Two Novels, the example that Bradford uses to moti-
vate the essential role of difficulty in achievement. Smith and Jones are nov-
elists with equal talent, and they produce novels of equal quality, but Jones
exerts significantly more effort in the process of writing his novel. Again,
Bradford suggests that, if two novelists produce books of equally good qual-
ity, but Jones faces enormous obstacles in producing the book but Smith
does not, Jones’ achievement is intuitively much greater. And, she suggests,
it is in virtue of the difficulty Jones faces that his achievement is greater. My
account so far offers a somewhat different answer. Qua creative ability, the
achievements of Jones and Smith are equivalent. Qua force of will, Jones’ is
greater.
It is true that, on either account, the verdict is similar: Jones achieves more
than Smith, and this is true in virtue of the greater difficulty he faces. But the
accounts diverge in their judgments when we toy with the details of the ex-
ample. Suppose Jones faces great obstacles inwriting his novel, and his novel
turns out to be significantly worse than that of Smith’s as a result. Here,
Bradford’s account seems to say that Jones’ achievement still has a greater
essential value than Smith’s, notwithstanding that Jones fails to write the
novel he could have written had he not faced such great obstacles. By con-
trast, when we relativize our judgments to distinct capacities, we get the
same result as we did in the case of Judith. Qua force of will, Jones’ achieve-
ment is greater than Smith’s, but qua creative ability, Smith’s is greater. We
don’t get a single decisive judgment about the value of their relative achieve-
ments, but again, this seems to me entirely consistent with our intuitions
about this sort of case.
As I suggested in Section 3, the reason that our judgments about achieve-
ment come apart in both the Tale of Two Novels and the Tale of Two Poets
is thatmany of the difficulties that the agents face are what wemight think of
as extrinsic to the activity they are engaged in. Jones loses his house, his wife,
and his dog in the process of writing his novel; these challenges interfere with
his ability to write, but they are not difficulties that are parts or aspects of the
writing process itself. Likewise, Judith is kept busy with chores and is mar-
ried against her will. She struggles to find the time and energy to write. These
difficulties prevent her from writing at all; they are not difficulties that char-
acterize her process of writing. In these sorts of cases, the conditions that
make possible the exercise of the will to a high degree also impede the exer-
cise of some other capacity. Compare this with the example of climbing
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Mount Everest. This is an enormously difficulty activity, but plausibly, most
of the difficulties an agent typically faces climbingMount Everest are intrin-
sic to the activity itself; it requires great effort in the form of physical endur-
ance, patience, and unwavering concentration. The conditions that require
the exercise of the will to a high degree are also, plausibly, the conditions that
require a high-level exercise of other characteristic human capacities: physi-
cal ability, technical skill, practical reason, and so on. In these sorts of cases,
the conditions thatmake possible the exercise of the will to a high degree also
demand the exercise of other capacities to a high degree. The upshot is that,
once we relativize our judgments of achievement to distinct capacities, it
turns out that many but not all great achievements are difficult, and not
all difficult activities will be unqualified achievements.
6.
Let’s take stock. I’ve argued that, while the Simple Product View can’t ex-
plain the value of achievements like running a marathon or climbingMount
Everest, the difficulty-based view faces different challenges. It is insensitive
to the way in which adverse conditions can undermine or threaten the value
of achievements, even as the will is being exercised to a high degree. Like-
wise, it cannot accommodate our intuitions about the value of achievements
that, as a result of an agent’s skill or ability being developed to a high degree,
are nearly effortless. The underlying problem for the difficulty-based view is
the appeal to a single, highly general capacity, the will, to explain the nature
and value of all achievements. Exercising the will to a high degree always in-
volves exerting a great deal of effort and does not depend in any way on a
result or product. But this is not true of other capacities that, intuitively,
are relevant to our judgments about the value of achievement.
In developing an alternative perfectionist account, two big questions arise
at this point. First, if I’m right that we need to appeal to a greater range of
distinct capacities, we need to determine which capacities are relevant for
judging whether some activity counts as an achievement. I have been speak-
ing loosely about Judith’s achievement qua poet, the virtuoso’s achievement
qua musician, Jones’ achievement qua will. We might worry that in place of
a tidy account of achievement that appeals to only two capacities, the will
and the rational capacity, we now have an account that relies on a hopelessly
indeterminate set of capacities the exercise of which is intrinsically valuable.
Second, one crucial way in which Bradford’s account improves on the Sim-
ple Product View is by capturing the way in which achievements are relative
to particular agents. Running tenmiles is an achievement for me, but it is not
for an ultra-marathoner. Tying my shoelaces is not an achievement for me,
but it may be for someone with advanced Parkinson’s disease. On
Bradford’s account, it is difficulty that captures the way in which
DIFFICULTY AND THE VALUE OF ACHIEVEMENT 17
© 2018 The Author
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2018 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
achievements are relative: difficulty is by its nature a relative notion. Is there
an alternative way to capture the relativity of achievement without appeal-
ing to difficulty?
Let me say something about each of these in turn. First, which are the
perfectionist capacities relevant for judgments about achievement? I’ve
been appealing to a wide range of distinct capacities or abilities, but most
contemporary perfectionist accounts appeal to a much narrower set of ca-
pacities. Rationality is almost always included in some form, often divided
into theoretical and practical rationality; some include a few others such as
physical capacities, rational agency, or, as on Bradford’s view, the will.26 It
would be beyond the scope of this paper for me to defend a positive ac-
count of the characteristic human capacities relevant for perfectionist
value. But if a perfectionist theory hopes to give an account of the nature
and value of achievement, it needs to be sensitive to the differences in the
ways in which various capacities are fully realized. One lesson of the discus-
sion so far is that different capacities are fully realized or expressed in dif-
ferent ways. Some capacities are, plausibly, fully expressed or realized in
certain kinds of products, while others are not. Likewise, some involve
great effort, but others do not. It should be a constraint on a successful per-
fectionist account of the characteristic human capacities that it can accom-
modate the diverse range of activities we take to be achievements. And part
of what this involves is capturing how some characteristic human capacities
can only be fully developed and expressed when certain material conditions
obtain; unlike the will, some perfectionist capacities are vulnerable to bad
fortune such that their full expression is not wholly within an agent’s
own control.
Although I leave the details to other work, it seems tome plausible that the
following capacities are intuitively worth developing and exercising: one’s
practical rationality, one’s theoretical rationality, one’s creativity, and one’s
physical abilities. The exercise of these capacities will constitute achieve-
ments ranging from an agent performing a good action with the right rea-
sons and desires, to a philosopher developing a sophisticated argument, to
William writing great poetry, to my running ten miles. Plausibly, as Brad-
ford suggests, the will should also be included as a distinct capacity. Perhaps,
there aremore than these, or perhaps, these capacities can be further reduced
into still fewer. Again, all I want to insist here is that, if a successful perfec-
tionist theory aims to capture our intuitions about which capacities are
worth developing and exercising, this will centrally involve capturing our in-
tuitions about which sorts of activities count as achievements and which fail
to count as unqualified achievements.
Turn now to the second question: is there an alternative way to capture the
relativity of achievement without appealing to difficulty? At various points, I
have appealed to a distinction betweenmerely exercising a capacity and fully
expressing or realizing it. The distinction is meant to be fairly intuitive. A
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professional athlete exercises her physical capacity when she walks across a
room. But she exercises it to a greater degree, or more fully, when she runs a
record-breaking marathon. I exercise my rational capacity when I read (or
reread) the Harry Potter series. But I exercise it more fully, or to a greater
degree, when I write an excellent piece of philosophy. An artist exercises
her creative ability when she absentmindedly doodles during class, but she
exercises it more fully, or to a greater degree, when she creates an elaborate
work of art. In each case, what counts as the full expression or realization of
the capacity is relative to the ability an agent has; the distinction is between
merely employing a capacity and what wemight think of as testing the limits
of a capacity.27
Here then, is the positive account: an achievement is a process culminating
in a product that is competently caused and that tests the limit of an agent’s
perfectionist capacity. I take on board the first and third features of
Bradford’s account, but replace the difficulty condition. In some cases, ‘test-
ing the limits’ of a capacity will require that the activity result in a product
with certain features. Often, ‘testing the limits’ of a capacity will involve
the exertion of great effort, and so it is no surprise that many achievements
turn out to be difficult. But in some cases, approximating the limits of a ca-
pacity will involve acting effortlessly. Where the limit of a capacity is located
will be relative to the agent in question.
To get clearer on the proposal, consider again A Tale of Two Songwriters
from Section 2. Taylor and Katy are both songwriters, but Taylor is signif-
icantly more talented than Katy. They exert an equal amount of effort, but
Taylor produces songs of exceptional quality whereas Katy writes mediocre
and uninspired music. Bradford’s view says that their achievements have
equal value because the two songwriters exert an equal amount of effort.
My view generates a similar verdict but for different reasons. Both Taylor
andKaty fully express their creative abilities in their songs, and both exercise
their will to an equal degree, notwithstanding that Taylor’s songs are of a
significantly higher quality. My account gives us different results from that
of Bradford’s when we toy with the details of the case. Suppose Taylor suf-
fers a concussion, and while recovering, she is only able to write songs of the
same mediocre quality as those Katy writes. Suppose that, in writing these
mediocre songs, Taylor exerts evenmore effort thanKaty does; she struggles
with the process of writing but, in addition, she suffers from headaches, loss
of memory, and difficulty focusing. Bradford’s view again says that the es-
sential value of Taylor’s achievement is greater than that of Katy’s. My view
says that, qua creative achievement, Taylor’s achievement has less essential
value; it does not fully express what she is capable of as a songwriter. This
is true even though her achievement qua force of will is greater than Katy’s.
It is, admittedly, vague what counts as ‘testing the limits’ of some capacity.
But it is similarly vague what counts as a sufficient degree of effort for some-
thing to count as an achievement on the difficulty-based view.28 Moreover,
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this indeterminacy doesn’t strikeme as a problematic feature of the view: our
intuitions about what activities count as achievements are themselves inde-
terminate. Again, the suggestion here is not that achievements are only those
activities that fully express our capacities. Rather, they are the activities that
approximate the full expression of our capacities. A professional athlete
achieves something remarkable when she runs a record-breaking marathon,
but she still achieves something impressive when she runs merely a near re-
cord-breaking marathon. A violinist achieves something remarkable when
he performs a complex piece flawlessly, but he still achieves something im-
pressive when he performs the same piece nearly flawlessly. A philosopher
achieves something remarkable when she writes a ground-breaking paper
on an important topic, but she still achieves something impressive when
she effectively responses to questions after a talk. Other things being equal,
the greater the degree to which an activity approximates the limit of an
agent’s capacity, the more valuable an achievement will be.
To sum up, my hope has been to build on the work of Bradford and others
in developing a perfectionist account of the nature and value of achievement.
Like Bradford, I think that a successful account of achievement should be
agent-relative and should not reduce the value of achievements to the value
of their results or products. But, I have argued, the difficulty-based view can-
not capture certain central cases of achievement and that this is because it is
too narrowly focused on one capacity, the will. The will, if it is a perfectionist
capacity, is a peculiar one: it does not depend in any way on some result or
product beyond the exertion of effort and so is not vulnerable to adversema-
terial conditions in the way other capacities are. Indeed, adverse conditions
merely provide opportunities for its exercise. To capture our intuitions about
the nature and value of achievement, a successful perfectionist account needs
to appeal to capacities that depend for their realization on resources, condi-
tions, and opportunities well outside of our control. If the perfectionist ac-
count we are left with is less egalitarian than we might have hoped, it is
also better placed to explain the badness of certain forms of injustice and
misfortune than the difficulty-based view. Certain forms of injustice and
misfortune are bad, in part, because they prevent agents from developing
and exercising the capacities that are central to who they are; they prevent
agents from fully being all they can be in their achievements.
Virginia Tech
NOTES
1 Bradford (2015). Bradford herself does not herself describe her view as a ‘difficulty-based’
account and, as will be clear, Bradford believes there are other elements that contribute to the
essential value of an achievement: for an activity to be an achievement, it must also be compe-
tently caused and an organic unity. However, difficulty plays the most important role on her
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account insofar as difficulty is what determines the relative value of achievements, once the ac-
tivities in question meet the threshold of being competently caused and organic unities. As such,
I think it is true to the spirit of her account to describe it as ‘difficulty-based’.
2 I take perfectionism to be, roughly, the view that the development and exercise of certain
characteristically human capacities is intrinsically valuable. In this paper, like Bradford in
Achievement, I am interested in perfectionism as an account of value rather than an account
of well-being; I leave open how perfectionist value might be accommodated in a theory of
well-being. Likewise, I set aside perfectionism as a moral theory. See, for example, Brink
(2003). Finally, I do not engage here with general objections against perfectionism. For more
on this, see Dorsey (2010) and responses from Bradford (2016).
3 For some recent accounts of achievement, see Arneson (1999), Bradford (2013, 2015,
2016), Hurka (1993, 2011), Keller (2004, 2009), Portmore (2007), and von Kriegstein and
(2017a,b). Like Bradford, Keller appeals to effort in explaining the value of achievement: ‘the
greater the effort required for an individual to achieve her goal, the more her welfare is
enhanced by its achievement’ (Keller, 2009, p. 34). Von Kriegstein (2017a) develops two
accounts of effort, ‘percentage-effort’ and ‘absolute-effort’ and argues that they are both
achievement-enhancing. Moreover, von Kriegstein (2017b) argues that Bradford’s account of
difficulty in terms of effort must be supplemented with an additional, agent-neutral dimension
of difficulty understood as low probability of success for a human beingwith average capabilities.
I discuss his view in more detail in Section 3.
4 Difficulty, for Bradford, is a matter of expending effort: something is difficult in virtue of
requiring a sufficient degree of effort. Different activities require effort in virtue of different
features but there is no class of features ‘such that they always require such a degree of effort that
they are always difficult’. The upshot is that the one common feature of all difficult things is the
effort expended. (Bradford, 2015, pp. 28–29). Bradford leaves the concept of effort unanalyzed;
she takes it to be familiar enough that, for her purposes, it can be treated as primitive.
5 Bradford (2015, pp. 12–25). SimonKeller offers a similar account of achievement as what
comes about by one’s own efforts (2004, p. 33). Likewise, Hurka takes achievements to be diffi-
cult and carried out ‘in a knowledgeable way’ (Hurka, 1993); see also Portmore (2007).
6 Bradford (2015, pp. 84–88).
7 Bradford (2015, pp. 88–90).
8 Bradford (2015, pp. 114–121).
9 Bradford (2015, p. 126).
10 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this case.
11 VonKriegstein (2017b) describes Bradford’s view as ‘oddly egalitarian’ (p. 6). He thinks it
is a problem for Bradford’s account of achievement that it cannot capture the way in which nat-
ural talents make possible greater achievements. An extremely gifted athlete, he suggests, is
surely able to achieve something much greater than a recreational athlete exerting the same
amount of effort. I share with von Kriegstein the idea that Bradford’s view is ‘too’ egalitarian
in one sense; as I will argue, we should not think it is entirely within an agent’s own control to
determine how valuable her achievement is. But I locate the problem with Bradford’s view in
a different place. I argue that what is missing is not the sort of agent-neutral dimension to
achievement that von Kriegstein proposes but rather a way of relativizing achievements to par-
ticular capacities.
12 Woolf (1929).
13 Indeed, onWoolf’s own imagining of the case, Judith feels so deeply the pain of her stifled
creativity and limited possibilities that she eventually takes her own life.
14 This is the response offered to me by Bradford in conversation.
15 Hassan presses the relevance of this distinction for Bradford’s view in his review of her
book. See Hassan (2015, pp. 762–763).
16 This is consistent with thinking that, for an activity to be an achievement, the agent has to
act intentionally, deliberately engaging in a particular process that culminates in a product. It
might be a necessary condition of an activity’s being an achievement that the agent aims to
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engage in a particular activity; this is, plausibly, part of what is required for the activity to have
been competently caused. But to say that an agent must intentionally engage in a certain activity
is different from saying that the agent’s goal determines whether her activity counts as an
achievement. ForWilliam’s poems to count as an achievement, he must have produced them de-
liberately, rather than by accident: he must have intended to write poetry. But if his goal is to
write the single greatest poem ever created by a human being, this goal does not, I am suggesting,
set the standard for whether his activity counts as an achievement.
17 For a rich discussion of the relationship between goals and achievement, see Hurka
(1993), especially pp. 99–113. Hurka suggests we understand practical perfection in terms of
the successful achievement of one’s goals, given justified beliefs that one’s actions will be success-
ful. He explores ways in which both the quality and number of one’s practical achievements can
enhance an individual’s perfection. See also Keller (2004, 2009); Keller (2004) focuses on the re-
lationship between the achievement of one’s goals and one’s welfare, arguing that an agent’s
achievement of her goals enhances her welfare in one respect, even when her goals are irrational,
immoral, or self-destructive.
18 Von Kriegstein (2017a, p. 23).
19 Von Kriegstein (2017a, p. 24).
20 As vonKriegstein himself acknowledges, the view he presents is meant to be a sketch, and
many of the details of his alternative account remain to be worked out. It isn’t clear to me how
the two dimensions of difficulty von Kriegstein proposes determine the value of an achievement
in cases where these two dimensions are in tension with each other. On von Kriegstein’s view, a
recent amputee who runs amile has performed something difficult where difficulty is understood
as exerting substantial effort but has not performed something difficult where difficulty is under-
stood as having a low probability of success for ‘an adult human being with average capabilities’.
Perhaps von Kriegstein will say that the amputee has performed something good but not great,
because her achievement is only difficult along one dimension. But the reason her activity is dif-
ficult for her, and counts as an achievement at all, is precisely because she is not endowed with
‘average capabilities’. It seems to me strange that her disability should, at the same time, count
both for and against the value of her achievement.More generally, I don’t have the intuition that
an able-bodied person’s running a half marathon is a greater achievement than a recent amputee
running a mile, keeping their effort levels equal. But it isn’t clear to me what is different between
this comparison, and the comparison between a gifted elite runner who runs a record-breaking
race and a casual athlete who barely manages to finish the race, keeping their effort levels equal.
It isn’t clear to me why we should treat the case of being naturally gifted relative to an average
human being any different from the case of being able-bodied relative of being disabled. But I
would not want to say that an able-bodied person achieves something more impressive than a
disabled person in some athletic activity, keeping their effort levels fixed. Of course, as Bradford
would say, there are ways inwhich the elite runner’s record-breaking race is more impressive and
more valuable than the casual athlete’s performance. But the ways in which it is more valuable –
that it demonstrates the limits of human potential, that it inspires other athletes, that it generates
revenue for sponsorship companies – do not seem to be parts of the essential value of the achieve-
ment itself.
21 One way to put this worry is that von Kriegstein’s view gives up too much of the
agent-relativity that we find on Bradford’s account. I do not have the intuition that the amputee
running amile is obviously less of an achievement than an elite athlete running a record-breaking
race. It might be that Bradford and I are interested in something somewhat different than von
Kriegstein in giving an account of achievement. As von Kriegstein suggests, his own view is that
achievement is determined by both agent-relative and agent-neutral factors. But, as von
Kriegstein recognizes, one might think instead there are simply two different concepts of
achievement, one agent-relative and one agent-neutral, which generate conflicting intuitions about
certain cases. Understood in this way, Bradford and I are interested in the agent-relative concept.
22 Bradford (2015, pp. 31, 38–39).
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23 As von Kriegstein points out, the best Bradford’s account can say about this case is that
the virtuoso’s performance would have been an achievement for some other talented violinist,
had they performed it; but insofar as it is performed by the virtuoso, it is no achievement at
all (2017b, pp. 7–8).
24 Guerrero (2017), in the context of discussing the conditions of moral responsibility, pro-
poses a distinction between effort-related difficulty and skill-related difficulty. The latter kind
of difficulty is due to circumstances or factors that are somewhat outside an agent’s control or
only under her control imperfectly. This is different from von Kriegstein’s proposed difficulty
as low probability of success: skill-related difficulty is a function of both the nature of the task
and an individual’s skill at performing that task. Guerrero’s proposal is perhaps consistent with
what I argue for here. The degree to which an agent realizes the limits of a capacity in some result
or productmight be thought in terms of skill-related difficulty. See alsoMcElwee (2015) who dis-
cusses difficulty in the context of demandingness objections tomoral theories. He suggests that it
should be sufficient to avoid blameworthiness that onemakes significant sacrifices for the sake of
promoting the good of others, even if these sacrifices fall short of the best one could do.
25 We might worry that the case of moral virtue is quite different from the kinds of skills and
abilities we have been considering so far. But there is good reason to think that, at least for Ar-
istotle, they are deeply similar.
26 Nearly all perfectionists, beginning with Aristotle, include rationality, typically divided
into theoretical and practical. David O. Brink and T.H. Green also include something like a ca-
pacity formoral action.Many perfectionists treat autonomy as a central human capacity. Others
include certain kinds of affective, non-rational capacities as well (e.g., Kraut, 2009).
27 It is also worth distinguishing between two ways we can talk about what an agent is capa-
ble of doing. We can talk about what she is, now, currently able to do, and we can talk about
what she would be able to dowere she to further develop the capacity in question. On classic per-
fectionist theories, the acquisition of virtue or skill is a stage along the development of a capacity:
many capacities that we have by nature need to be developed or perfected before they can be
fully expressed. Even the most gifted mathematician must be educated and train a great deal be-
fore she can prove complex theorems. Likewise, a talented poet must work at her craft, honing
her skill, before her poems reflect her innate talent. Sometimes when we judge the value of an
achievement, we do so relative to what an agent is currently capable of doing: an aspiring violin-
ist achieves something impressive when, for the first time, he plays a simple piece flawlessly. In
other contexts, when we judge the value of an achievement, we do so relative to what the agent
would be capable of doing once her capacity is fully developed: Judith fails to write the sort of
poetry that she would write were her talents fully developed. The most valuable achievements
will be those that reflect what the agent is capable of doing once her capacity is fully developed.
28 This is not to say that the concept of difficulty is itself vague on Bradford’s view. Indeed,
much of her book is devoted to fleshing out the nature of difficulty.
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